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One of  the major success stories of the era since the Second World War has 
been the liberalization of the international trading system. Trade in goods and 
services among nations has grown at a rate more than one and a half times the 
rate of growth of world GNP. Partly in consequence of rapid growth of trade, 
growth rates of  world  real output reached sustained levels previously  unat- 
tained in human history. 
There is no question  but  that  the  open, multilateral  trading  system (the 
GATT system, for short) was a major factor in contributing to world economic 
growth and that future growth of trade and of the world economy is dependent 
on the maintenance  of the system. However, one important reason why the 
GATT system flourished was American support for it. The U.S. commitment 
to the principle of most-favored-nation treatment of all trading partners and its 
support of  GATT provided the leadership that enabled successive rounds of 
multilateral reductions in trade barriers and trade liberalization. 
In recent years, the American Commitment to an open multilateral  system 
has been,  at least to a degree, eroded, as U.S. policy has shifted to a "two- 
pronged"  approach. On the one hand, the United States has continued to par- 
ticipate in the Uruguay  Round of  trade negotiations; on the other hand, the 
United States has indicated a willingness to bargain bilaterally for free trade 
areas with individual trading nations. I 
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I. It  is outside the purpose of  this paper to attempt to analyze the reasons for this shift in 
approach. Suffice it to say that there are several motives, and different parties undoubtedly place 
different weight on each of them.  For some, frustration with the American inability to proceed 
further under GATT has been a factor, and this has certainly been the stated American position. 
For  these individuals, bilateralism is intended as a supplement to GATT. For some others, bilat- 
eralism has appeared as an  attractive alternative to multilateralism,  even perhaps providing an 
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As a consequence of that willingness, the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agree- 
ment has already been signed, and the U.S.-Canada  free trade area is in its 
transition  phase.  The United States and Mexico have announced their inten- 
tion to negotiate a free trade agreement (FTA), with Canada included  in the 
bargaining,  and President Bush has announced the Enterprise for the Ameri- 
cas, under which it is contemplated  that the  United States might enter into 
FTAs with other Latin American countries.2 
The possibility of a hemisphere-wide  trading area raises a number of im- 
portant questions. The most significant issues concern the degree of commit- 
ment  the  United  States  maintains  for  the  open,  multilateral  system.  The 
United States has maintained that its free trade area arrangements will be con- 
sistent with GATT and, indeed, will constitute “super-GATT’’ arrangements 
among countries  willing to pursue  free trade beyond  their commitments  in 
GATT. Whether that contention is valid is itself a subject in need of consider- 
able analysis, although the test will be in the evolution of the GATT system, 
the outcome of the Uruguay Round, and subsequent trading relations. A sec- 
ond major issue is the extent to which the world trading system may dege,ner- 
ate into trading  blocks.  Some fear that the European  Community  (EC) ar- 
rangements  may  turn  into  a  “Fortress  Europe,”  although  events  to  date 
surrounding  1992 do not  support  that  view.  Were Europe  and  the  Western 
Hemisphere each to evolve trading arrangements that gave strong preferences 
to regional trading partners, it would surely elicit responses from other trading 
countries.  That possibility  appears remote  at the present time: not  only are 
trading relations between Europe, North America, and East Asia important to 
all groups of  countries, but the market forces emanating from lowered costs 
of communications  and transportation  continue to lead to incentives  for in- 
creasing integration of  the  world economy  and greater economic losses for 
countries that choose to erect protective barriers against imports. 
On the assumption that the basic framework for international trade will re- 
main  the open, multilateral  trading  system, questions arise as to the likely 
effect of FTAs  between the United States and other Westem Hemisphere coun- 
tries on East Asian countries.  The purpose of  this paper is to examine that 
question. It is assumed that American negotiations with other Western Hemi- 
sphere countries are and will continue to be GATT compatible. In that con- 
text, I examine the potential effects of such American bilateral Western Hemi- 
umbrella under which protection for their interests might be increased. For still others, a foreign 
policy motive, especially regarding Canada and Mexico, has been important. For a discussion, 
see Schott (1989b). 
2. The United States ha5 taken other steps that indicate an erosion of the traditional commitment 
to multilateral trading arrangements. Bilateral bargaining over trade barriers is a prominent ex- 
ample. Perhaps best known, however, is the inclusion of  “Super-301’’ in the 1988 Trade Expan- 
sion Act. Under that provision, the U.S. trade representative is authorized unilaterally to declare 
countries “unfair traders” without resort to GATT procedures. For a discussion of “Super-301 ,” 
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spheric  trading  arrangements  on  other  American  trading  partners  and 
especially the East Asian “superexporters,” who have long relied on the rela- 
tively open American market in pursuing their strategy of export-led growth. 
It is well known that preferential trading arrangements can be welfare im- 
proving or welfare reducing depending in part on whether they are “trade cre- 
ating” or “trade diverting.”  Especially  given the  likelihood that the  United 
States will sequentially enter into FTAs with other Western Hemisphere coun- 
tries, there is the potential for trade diversion and rediversion throughout the 
hemisphere.  In addition,  there are significant questions about how those ar- 
rangements might affect East Asian trading partners. 
I will argue that any assessment of existing economic conditions and trad- 
ing patterns  among  Western  Hemisphere  countries  suggests that  the  direct 
trade diversion resulting from these arrangements on East Asian trade will be 
minimal.  Indeed, given  the  small  share of East Asian  exports  in the Latin 
American markets at the present time,  it can be argued that,  if the Western 
Hemisphere FTAs are successful, they should stimulate more rapid economic 
growth in the Latin American countries. To the extent that they do that, East 
Asian countries may gain as the increased participation in international trade 
and the more rapid economic growth of the countries in question more than 
offset whatever small amount of trade diversion there may be. 
The analysis proceeds as follows. The first section reviews the current sta- 
tus of Western Hemisphere bilateral trading arrangements. Even the prospec- 
tive Mexican agreement has not yet been negotiated, and there are many ques- 
tions pertaining to the extent that it will actually free trade between the United 
States and Mexico.  The second section then analyzes the current patterns of 
trade between the relevant  pairs of trading countries.  The dominance of  the 
United States in trade with Canada and Mexico is seen, which limits the pos- 
sible order of  magnitude  of  trade diversion from existing trade  flows.  The 
third  section then considers  the commodity composition of  U.S. trade with 
East Asian countries and the possible initial order of magnitude of trade diver- 
sion of  the current bilateral trading arrangements.  The final section then as- 
sesses the relation of the current and prospective Western Hemisphere trading 
arrangements in the context of an open, multilateral trading system. It will be 
argued that U.S. tariffs are low enough that the potential  for trade diversion 
from  East Asia to Latin  America is limited, although there  are interesting 
questions concerning  the effect of the FTA  arrangements  on the Multifiber 
Arrangement (MFA) and world trade in textiles and apparel. However, levels 
of protection in Latin American countries remain significantly higher. Should 
FTAs be negotiated,  there would be an initial wide margin of preference for 
commodities from other FTA members. An offsetting consideration, however, 
is that businesses in FTA  countries other than the United States would per- 
ceive themselves to be  subject to higher costs than  their U.S.  counterparts 
because of these tariffs; pressures should therefore arise for reductions in pro- 
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the FTA would be greater and the potential for trade diversion considerably 
weakened. 
2.1  A Western Hemisphere Free lkade Area? 
Although  American officials spoke of their willingness to enter into bilat- 
eral agreements with “like-minded free trading countries” as early as 1983 and 
actually  signed an  FTA  with  Israel, it  was  not  until  the U.S.-Canada Free 
Trade Agreement  was  successfully  negotiated  in  1987 that these statements 
began to assume imp~rtance.~  Even then, Canada and the United States have 
such a long border and sufficiently close trading relations that a Free Trade 
Agreement  could be regarded  as a natural “GATT-plus’’ arrangement  under 
which  barriers  in addition  to those  negotiated  away under  GATT could be 
removed. 
Even after it was negotiated, it was at least plausible that the U.S.-Canada 
arrangement would be the only major initiative under announced American 
policy and that  it would be largely trade creating.  During the period  1986- 
88, few thought  that any Latin American  country would  seriously contem- 
plate  entering into such  an arrangement, despite the  fact  that  “framework 
agreements” had already been entered into by several Latin American coun- 
tries.4 Not only were most Latin American countries still highly protectionist, 
but many of  them continued to experience severe macroeconomic instability; 
in these circumstances, it appeared highly unrealistic to think that a free trade 
area was a serious alternative. 
However, all that changed when the president of  Mexico announced in the 
spring of  1990 the intention of the government of Mexico to seek an FTA with 
the United States. Although Mexico had a long history of very high protection 
against imports (both through tariffs and, after 1982, through quantitative re- 
strictions on imports) and was experiencing rapid inflation, in the mid- and 
late  1980s the Mexican government had already undertaken a series of steps 
designed to reform economic policies. Not only had quantitative restrictions 
on imports been almost entirely removed, but the average level of tariffs had 
3. The U.S.-Israel Free Trade Agreement is not analyzed in this paper. Israel’s trade with the 
United States is sufficiently small and different from that of Latin American and East Asian coun- 
tries that it is not a major consideration for an analysis of potential effects of a North American 
free trade area on East Asian exporters. For an analysis of the agreement, see Rosen (1989). The 
Caribbean Basin Initiative, which was passed by  Congress in  1983, was the first use of  regional 
trade preferences under U.S. trade law. While not creating a free trade area, the Caribbean Basin 
Economic Recovery Act of  1983 (and subsequent amendments) provided duty-free access to the 
U.S. market for certain commodities not already covered by preferential treatment under the Gen- 
eralized System of Preferences. 
The U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement came into force on 2 January 1988 and provided for a 
ten-year phase-in of agreed-on liberalizing measures. To  date, tariffs have been reduced at a rate 
more rapid than that envisaged in the agreement. The idea of a U.S.-Canada free trade area was 
not a new one. It had been seriously considered several times before, but rejected by Canada (see 
U.S. Council of Economic Advisers 1988, chap. 4). 
4. For a listing of the countries with which the United States has signed framework agreements, 
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been sharply reduced. In addition, serious efforts to deregulate domestic eco- 
nomic activities (such as freight transport) and to privatize state-owned firms 
were under way. While inflation remained (and remains) a difficult problem, 
associated in part with heavy obligations for servicing internal as well as ex- 
ternal debt, the idea of a free trade area with the United States did not appear 
as unrealistic as it would have had the policies of  the  1960s and  1970s still 
been in effect. 
At the time this paper was written (mid-1991), negotiations had not begun 
on the U.S.-Mexico FTA. Since the ultimate agreement may take a variety of 
forms, any judgment as to the effects of the agreement must be based on some 
assumptions regarding the outcome of the  negotiation^.^ A number of signifi- 
cant questions remain to be addressed, including the key issue of  the relation 
of the U. S.  -Mexico FTA to the U. S.  -Canada FTA and the subsequent linkages 
between  Mexico and Canada and any further signatories of  FTAs with  the 
United  States.6 In addition,  it is not known whether the agreement will be 
across the board or sectoral in nature. 
From a Mexican perspective, major concerns arise over U.S. willingness to 
permit  Mexican  construction  firms,  trucking  companies, and  other  labor- 
intensive services to operate in the United States. The United States, in turn, 
wants access to the Mexican market in high-tech  services and liberal condi- 
tions governing direct foreign investment in Mexico.  A key issue in all free 
trade agreements, but especially so when there is a long, open border, is what 
rules of origin will be adopted and what criteria and mechanisms will be es- 
tablished for their enforcement. There are also important questions regarding 
the treatment of  Mexican imports  into the United  States (and possibly  into 
Canada) of  textiles and clothing in commodity lines for which MFA quotas 
are in force. Finally, as with the U.S.-Canada  agreement, key issues concern 
the  application  of  U.S.  antidumping  and  countervailing duty  provisions to 
Mexican exports to the United States. 
How “trade creating” the U.S.-Mexico FTA will be will depend greatly on 
these  provisions  and the evolution of  the agreement.  As of the  summer of 
1991, that outcome is by no means clear. There are a number of issues that are 
politically contentious in the United  States, and the opposition of  American 
labor to any agreement has been vehement.’  There will be especially difficult 
5. There are also important questions regarding Mexican exchange rate policy and macroeco- 
nomic balance that will  have an  important  effect on the evolution of  any U.S.-Mexico FTA. 
Should the Mexican authorities attempt to control the nominal exchange rate in the face of domes- 
tic inflation, e.g.,  the probable outcome would be unsustainable current account deficits with the 
United States in the short run. The response to this event would have to be either to alter monetary/ 
fiscal/exchange rate policy or to abandon the FTA. Which of these courses would be chosen is a 
matter for speculation. 
6.  For analyses of  the potential difficulties with a series of bilateral agreements between the 
United States and individual trading partners, see Park and Yo0 (1989) and Wonnacott (1990). 
7. American labor has been joined in its opposition by  some environmental groups, and it is 
unclear how the American administration will deal with these issues. The U.S.  trade representa- 
tive has provided Congress with assurances that these issues will be dealt with in the course of the 
negotiations (New York Times, 15 May 1991, 1, C2). 30  Anne 0.  Krueger 
issues concerning Mexico’s access to the American  market  for textiles  and 
apparel, for many agricultural products (where phytosanitary regulations are 
the main trade barrier), and for overland and ocean shipping. On the Mexican 
side, there  are questions as to macroeconomic  policy,  American  access  to 
Mexican petroleum resources and various parts of the services industries, reg- 
ulations governing direct foreign investment, and other issues. 
As a consequence of these uncertainties,  one can well imagine a de mini- 
mus agreement, to be phased in over a long time period, with negligible ef- 
fects  on the  flow of  goods and services  between  Mexico and  its  northern 
neighbors for the foreseeable future. Alternatively,  one can equally imagine 
an agreement that effectively removes most trade barriers within a reasonably 
short period of time and the consequent rapid  expansion of flows.  For pur- 
poses of  this paper,  it  will  be assumed  that the FTA takes  the latter form, 
providing  virtually  full  mobility  of  goods, services, and capital  within  the 
foreseeable future.8 
Subsequent to the  announcement that  there  would  be  negotiations  for a 
U.S.-Mexico FTA, President Bush announced the Enterprise for the Americas 
in June 1990. In effect, this was a statement of American willingness to enter 
into FTAs with any interested Latin American countries willing to meet cer- 
tain conditions.y  Again, the relationships of new FTA entrants to those already 
party to an FTA have not been clarified, and no negotiations have begun. To 
date, Chile has expressed serious interest in such negotiations. Given the low 
level of prevailing Chilean tariffs and Chile’s stable macroeconomic situation, 
it is economically realistic to assume that such an FTA could be agreed on and 
implemented within a fairly short period of time. 
For other Latin American countries, however, the situation is very different. 
8. Even should the negotiated agreement itself be toward much freer trade, there are questions 
as to whether Mexico can achieve the stated goal of maintaining a fixed exchange rate vis-a-vis 
the dollar as the agreement enters force. There are two serious dangers. (1) The Mexican authori- 
ties might attempt to fix the nominal exchange rate at an unrealistic level. If this happened, the 
consequences for income and employment in Mexico would not be dissimilar to those for East 
Germany after reunification with West Germany in 1990, and it is questionable whether any Mex- 
ican government could continue with that policy stance. (2) The initial exchange rate might be 
established in such a way that the real exchange rate was initially realistic, but Mexican monetary 
and fiscal policy might be incompatible with the maintenance of that real rate at a fixed nominal 
exchange rate. A fixed exchange rate regime in conjunction with the FTA  would not be sustainable 
in that circumstance.  Should either of these dangers materialize, monetarylfiscallexchange  rate 
policy would have to change, or the FTA would have to be abandoned in the longer run. 
9. These conditions included primarily the reliance on the private sector and market forces to 
guide the preponderance  of  economic  activity and  the existence of  relatively open access for 
foreign direct investment. Inducements to join the Enterprise for the Americas included the prom- 
ise of not only preferential access to the American market but also favorable consideration for 
debt-relief negotiations. A number of important questions remain unresolved. Chief among them 
is whether negotiations will be bilateral, with the result that many countries will have FTAs  with 
the United States but not with each other, or whether a technique will be found for multilateraliz- 
ing the FTA. The existence of a number of bilateral FTAs  between the United States and individual 
Western Hemisphere countries would create a number of legal and administrative issues. For an 
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Most of them retain very high walls of protection against imports, which im- 
plies that a move toward an FTA with the United States would require a major 
realignment  of  the  existing  trade regime.’(’ In  addition,  a number of  Latin 
American countries exhibit a high degree of macroeconomic instability. De- 
spite repeated announcements of plans and programs to stabilize the economy 
and reduce inflation, success has been elusive in most countries.lI 
For that reason,  analysis in this paper is largely confined to the potential 
effect of a U.S.-Mexico FTA  under the assumption that the agreement is one 
that permits virtually free movement of goods, services, and capital across the 
border.  On the one hand, it is not even clear whether the U.S.-Mexico  FTA 
will be that liberalizing, and other FTAs are even further in the future. On the 
other hand,  Mexico  is  a very  large trading  country,  representing  a sizable 
share of all U.S.-Latin  America trade. An examination of  the potential orders 
of magnitude of the effects of a U.S.-Mexico FTA provides, therefore, a rea- 
sonable basis  for a judgment as to what  may happen over the intermediate 
term for the entire Western Hemisphere trading arrangements. 
2.2  Current Rading Patterns 
It thus seems plausible to assume that, over the next five years, any Western 
Hemisphere integration that does occur will take place between Canada, the 
United States, and Mexico. Table 2.1 gives some salient data on their trade. 
As can be seen, the United  States is the “giant” among the three. Although 
Mexico’s  population,  at  85 million,  is about  one-third  that  of  the  United 
States, its per capita income is about one-tenth that of  the United  States.12 
Thus, Canada, with a much smaller population but a per capita income similar 
to that in the United States, has a GNP approximately one-quarter that of the 
United States, while Mexico’s GNP in dollar terms in 1989 was about 3 per- 
cent that of the United States. 
10. For many Latin American countries that still have highly restrictive trade regimes and coun- 
tries that are in the process of  removing trade barriers, there are significant questions as to why 
they should not liberalize unilaterally vis-&,is  the entire world,  rather than joining a Western 
Hemisphere FTA. The issue is perhaps most important for those countries whose share of trade 
with the United States is smaller than that of Mexico and Canada. For an analysis, see Nogues 
(  1990). 
11. The macroeconomic instability issue is most pronounced in Argentina and Brazil-the  two 
largest exporters in South America. Those two countries,  along with Uruguay and  Paraguay, 
recently entered an agreement to form an FTA among themselves within five years. That FTA was 
announced as a “first step” toward a hemisphere-wide arrangement. Even among those four coun- 
tries, macroeconomic imbalances are large, and trade bamers are high. It is thus questionable 
whether they  can achieve welfare-improving  integration among themselves over the next five 
years and virtually certain that their entry into a hemisphere-wide FTA would not begin for the 
better part of a decade. 
12. These proportions are not very different from those between East and West Germany at the 
time of German reunification. East Germany had a population of about 17 million and a per capita 
income estimated to be about one-eighth that of West Germany; West Germany’s population was 
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Table 2.1  Basic Data on the United States, Canada, and Mexico, 1989 
U.S.  Canada  Mexico 
Population (millions) 
GNP (billions of U.S.$) 
GNP per capita 
Total exports (billions of U.S.$) 
Percentage exports of GNP 




Total imports (billions of  U.S.$) 
Percentage imports of GNP 







































Sources:  International  Monetary  Fund, International Financial Statistics  Yearbook,  1990; and 
Direction of  Trade Statistics  Yearbook, 1990. 
Note: Exports are c.i.f.;  imports are f.0.b. 
‘GDP for Mexico. 
If attention turns to relative importance in trade, relative size is not dissim- 
ilar: Canadian exports represent more than one-fifth of  GNP and were $121 
billion  in  1989; American exports were $364 billion  and 7 percent  of  GNP. 
Absolutely,  however,  U.S. exports were much  larger,  at $364 billion,  con- 
trasted with Canada’s $121 billion. Mexico’s exports constituted just 14 per- 
cent  of  GNP,  reflecting  in  part  the  residual  effect  of  that  country’s half- 
century-long policy of  protection. Total Mexican exports, at $24.8 billion in 
1989, were  about  8 percent  of  those of  the  United  States. The figures for 
imports are roughly comparable. 
Turning our attention to the relative importance of  each of the countries as 
trading partners  for the other two, asymmetry  is immediately evident.  The 
United  States is the destination  for 70  percent  of  Canada’s  exports  and 63 
percent of Mexico’s; Canada obtains 63 percent of its imports from the United 
States and Mexico 67 percent.  But when the U.S. trade pattern is examined, 
the relationship is very different. Although Canada is the United States’s larg- 
est  trading  partner,  only  21.5  percent  of  exports  are  destined  for  Canada 
and 6.9 percent for Mexico; on the import side, 18 percent of American im- 
ports originated in Canada and 1.8  percent originated in Mexico. Interestingly, 
also, trade  relations  between  Canada  and  Mexico  are  symmetrically  very 
small. Less than 1 percent of Canadian exports went to Mexico, and 2.4 per- 
cent of Mexico’s exports went to Canada, with a similar pattern on the import 
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The United States is clearly the predominant trading partner for Canada and 
Mexico.  Moreover, American protection levels for most imports are consid- 
erably lower than those of Canada and Mexico.13 The average Canadian tariff 
level against imports from the United States was estimated to be 10.4  percent, 
while the average American tariff against Canada was 3.3 percent at the time 
the FTA went into effect (U.S. Council of  Economic Advisers  1988). Mexi- 
co’s average tariff level against U.S. imports is currently estimated to be about 
10 percent,  while the average U.S. tariff against Mexican imports is about 4 
percent (U.S. Council of Economic Advisers 1991). Because of the large size 
of the American market and its general openness, it is reasonable to conclude 
that, for Canada and Mexico, the decision to enter an FTA  with the United 
States is largely trade creating. 
Given the low average U.S. tariff level, the margin of preference for Cana- 
dian and Mexican  goods is and will continue to be fairly small. This fact, 
combined with the very low levels of trade between Mexico and Canada, on 
the one hand, and East Asia, on the other, suggests that the potential for trade 
diversion from East Asian sources to U.S. sources for Canadian and Mexican 
imports is fairly small.  l4 
Table 2.2 gives data on Canada’s commodity composition of  exports.  As 
can be seen, except for road vehicles (where the U.S.-Canada  Auto Pact ac- 
counted for almost the entire volume of trade), Canada’s comparative advan- 
tage is based  strongly on its abundance  of  natural  resources.  Of  the  $29.6 
billion of Canadian exports destined to countries other than the United States, 
$20  billion  consisted  of  primary  commodities.  It is therefore unlikely  that 
Canada will be able to use the  small margin of preference under American 
tariffs to divert U.S. or Mexican imports from East Asian sources to Canadian 
sources. Likewise, Canadian imports of manufactured commodities from East 
Asian countries are small (and negligible from Mexico),  and trade diversion 
in significant orders of magnitude does not appear to be a realistic possibility. 
The average Canadian tariff of 10.4 percent suggests that there may be scope 
for increased Canadian  imports  from the United  States as tariff barriers are 
reduced. Those increases should, however, be largely trade creating. 
Rather, it is with Mexico that East Asian exporters may be more concerned. 
Mexico’s low wage rate and other advantages in manufacturing vis-h-vis the 
United  States  appear more  similar to those  historically  held  by  East  Asia. 
Canadian hourly compensation costs for production workers averaged $14.72 
in 1989. This figure was above the U.S. average of $14.31 and the Japanese 
$12.73. Not only was Mexico’s average $1.72 well below those in the indus- 
trialized countries, as would be expected, but it was also below average hourly 
13. The important exception is textiles and clothing. See the discussion in sec. 2.3 below. 
14. In  1985, the last year for which data are available from international sources, Japanese 
imports from Mexico were $1.7 billion, of which more than $1.5 billion was petroleum. Mexican 
imports from Japan were $842 million, of  which more than half  were machinery and transport 
equipment and much of the remainder chemical products. Data are from United Nations (1988). 34  Anne 0.  Krueger 
Tahle 2.2  Canadian 'kade with the World and with the United States, 1990 
(billions of U.S. dollars) 
Exports to:  Imports from: 
World  U.S.  World  U.S. 
Total 
0.  Food and livestock 
1.  Beverages and tobacco 
2.  Crude materials 
3.  Mineral fuels 
4. Animal fats 
5. Chemical products 
119.4  89.8  116.  I  74.8 
9.2  3.8  6.2  3.6 
.7  .4  .6  .1 
17.3  7.7  3.9  2.8 
13.0  11.0  7.4  2. I 
.2  .I  .I  .I 
6.6  4.5  7.8  5.8 
6. Manufactures based on primary  20.1  16.1  14.8  9.6 
commodities 
6.4 Paper  7.7  6.5  1.6  1.3 
6.5 Textiles  .6  .4  2.3  I .2 
6.6 Mineral products  .8  .7  1.9  1.1 
6.7 Iron and steel  2.0  1.6  2.3  1.3 
6.8 Nonferrous metal products  5.5  4.0  I .7  1.3 
6.9 Metal products  1.6  1.4  3.  I  2.1 
7.  Machinery and transport equipment  45.6  41.0  58.7  41.9 
7.1 Power machinery  3.4  2.7  5.3  4.0 
7.2  Special machinery  1.9  1.4  4.8  3.0 
7.6 Telecommunications  1.5  1 .o  3.0  1.3 
7.7 Electric machinery  3.7  3.4  8.8  6.3 
7.8 Road vehicles  26.8  26.3  22.2  17.0 
8, Miscellaneous manufactures  4.3  3.6  13.9  1.3 
8.2  Furniture  1.3  1.2  1.1  .7 
8.5 Footwear  .1  .1  .8  .I 
8.7 Scientific equipment  .7  .5  2.4  1.9 
8.8 Cameras and clocks  .2  .2  1.1  .5 
9.  Miscellaneous manufactures  2.4  1.3  2.6  I .5 
Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Foreign Trade by Commodi- 
ties,  ser. C, 1990, vols. 2 and 3 (Paris, 1991). 
7.5  Office machinery  2.4  1.9  5.2  3.3 
8.4 Apparel  .3  .2  2.4  .2 
- 
compensation for Korea ($3.57),  Taiwan ($3.53),  and other East Asian newly 
industrializing countries. l5 
2.3  Rade Diversion from Asia? 
It thus appears that, if there is any quantitatively significant concern about 
trade diversion from East Asian countries resulting from the formation of a 
North American (and possibly, ultimately, a Western Hemisphere) free trade 
15. U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Office of Productivity and Technol- 
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area, that concern should center on Mexico’s ability to compete, primarily in 
the U.S. market,  because of  her margin of  preference under the FI’A. Even 
there,  several considerations  suggest that there may be  significant, perhaps 
even total, offsets to any trade diversion that does occur. First and most im- 
portant, Mexico encountered  enormous  economic  difficulties in the  1980s, 
reflected  in  its  debt  crisis  in  1982, stagnant per  capita income over  much 
of  the decade, and high rates of inflation.  In responding to these economic 
difficulties,  the  government  has  already  shifted  from a  highly  restrictive, 
inner-oriented trade regime to a much more liberalized one with relatively low 
tariffs, and growth has gradually resumed.  Although  inflation remains prob- 
lematic for Mexico, there is some basis for optimism that it may be controlled, 
or at least its side effects  suppressed.  Should that  happen, the potential  for 
accelerated economic growth in Mexico is substantial and would be so even 
in the  absence of an FTA.  That growth would naturally  be spearheaded by 
expanding exports, as producers respond to the altered incentives that a more 
liberalized trade regime and realistic exchange rates created. As such, Mexico 
might in  any event become more competitive,  especially  in labor-intensive 
commodities as labor costs rise in the East Asian countries.  To  a degree, it 
might be more natural to consider Mexico as a competitor for the “next tier” 
of  countries  that  may  achieve  rapid  development  through  export-oriented 
growth-countries  such as Sri Lanka, Turkey,  and  perhaps  Brazil,  where 
hourly compensation  is also well below that in East Asian newly industrial- 
ized countries (NICs). 
A  second,  equally  important  consideration  is  that  Mexican  export-led 
growth would  naturally be accompanied by rising  imports.  Therefore,  even 
should some trade diversion occur as a result of the FTA, it would be at least 
partially offset, from an East Asian perspective, by more rapid growth of total 
Mexican imports, a growth in which East Asia would doubtless share.I6 
The notion of trade diversion is static and refers to existing trade whose 
sources  might be  altered  as a consequence  of  preferential trading  arrsnge- 
rnents. Any examination of the possible orders of magnitude should be based 
on the existing commodity composition of trade, in this case U.S.  imports. 
Table 2.3 gives data on U.S. imports from Mexico, other Latin American 
countries, and East Asian countries in 1990. A first significant characteristic 
to note is that almost half of U.S. imports from Latin America are from Mex- 
ico, reflecting  the close ties that already exist between those two countries. 
The second phenomenon  is equally important: American imports from East 
Asia are much greater than are those from Latin America. Mexico’s total ex- 
16. The argument is similar to one that can be made retrospectively for Europe: it is no doubt 
true that there was some trade diversion as the European Common Market was created. The more 
important reality, however, was that the EC was created in the context of overall trade liberaliza- 
tion and that liberalization spurred economic growth. On net, therefore, trade flows with  third 
countries grew more rapidly than they would have  in  the  absence of  the  Common Market and 
trade liberalization. Thus, U.S.  trade with Europe increased rapidly during the period of European 
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ble 2.3  U.S. Imports from Western Hemisphere and East Asian Countries, 1990 
(billions of U.S. dollars) 
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mary commodities 




30.8  36.0 
2.8  7.3 
.3  .3 
.8  1.8 
5.5  13.6 
.o  .o 
.7  1.2 
2.6  3.6 
13.8  2.5 
3.1  4.9 
I .3  .5 
93.1  19.3  23.8  10.1  9.9 
.3  .2  .3  .I  .I 
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9.6  8.6  10.0  1.0  6.5 
1.4  .I  .3  .4  .3 
rrce: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Foreign Trade by Commodities, ser. 
1990, vol. 3 (Paris, 1991). 
ports to the United States (including oil) are about the same in total magnitude 
as those from Taiwan and Hong Kong and less than one-third those from Ja- 
pan. Moreover, almost all the East Asian exports to the United States consist 
of  manufactured  products,  whereas  more  than  one-third  of  Mexico’s  and 
about two-thirds of the rest of Latin America’s exports to the United States are 
in  commodity categories 0-4.  Thus, if  one eliminates  those  categories  in 
which East Asia is not  now exporting to the U.S. market, Latin America’s 
total exports to the United States were $65.3 billion in 1990, contrasted with 
$156.2 billion  from  East  Asia.  While  Latin  American  exports-most  of 
which are Mexican-of  manufactures to the United States are not negligible, 
they are small contrasted with those of East Asia. 
Closer examination of  the  commodity composition  of  manufactured  im- 
ports to  the United States suggests that the scope for trade diversion out of 
existing trade flows is even smaller than that. Table 2.4 gives the commodity 
composition  of  American  imports of manufactures  by countries. As can be 
seen, the major commodity category in which there appears to be significant 
U.S.  imports from both  East  Asia and Mexico  is machinery  and transport 
equipment. In that category, Mexico is a much larger exporter than the rest of 
Latin America  combined, exporting $13.8 billion  in  1990, contrasted  with 
Japan’s exports of $71.6 billion and exports from Singapore, Korea, and Tai- 
wan of $7.8, $7.8, and $9.4 billion, respectively. 
It should be noted, however, that the machinery  and transport equipment 
category is the one with the greatest Mexican maquiladora exports.  Because 
17. The maquiladora industries operate under special sections of the US.  trade law that permit 
the export of parts and components for assembly abroad. Mexico has special legislation governing 37  American Bilateral Trading Arrangements and East Asia 
Table 2.4  U.S. Imports of Manufactures from Latin America and East Asia by WO- 
Digit Industries, 1990 (billions of U.S. dollars) 
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Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Foreign Trade by Commodifies,  ser. 
C, 1990, vol. 2 (Paris, 1991). 
those exports are already duty free and compete head-on with East Asian ex- 
ports (entering under the same provisions of the trade law) under current U.S. 
trade law, these activities are ones where an FTA  is unlikely to provide any 
additional competitive advantage to Mexico. Even when U.S. imports do not 
originate in maquiladoras, the average tariff rate on machinery and equipment 
imports into the United States is 4.5  percent. 
For Mexican exports outside maquiladoras, U.S. duties are low on most 
commodities, and there are few quantitative restrictions on manufactured im- 
ports except for textiles and apparel. As can be seen from table 2.4, Mexican 
exports to the United States in those commodity categories are currently very 
small, but  it is conceivable  that they  are constrained  by the Multifiber Ar- 
rangement, rather than by any lack of comparative advantage.  Although Ja- 
the operation of the maquiladora factories; their output has been a major part of the expansion of 
manufactures in recent years. For an analysis of  maquiladora industries, see Zerm~o  (1987). It 
is estimated that 45 percent of Mexico’s manufactured exports to the United States in 1988 origi- 
nated in maquiladoras (U.S. Council of Economic Advisers 1991, 254). 38  Anne 0.  Krueger 
pan’s exports of these commodities are insignificant, Korea and Taiwan con- 
tinue to export substantially under their MFA quotas, and ifMexican imports 
were permitted freely under the FTA, there could be trade diversion  in that 
commodity category. 
To  examine how severe such trade diversion might be, U.S. imports under 
the Multifiber Arrangement were separately examined. The data are given in 
table  2.5. As can be  seen, Mexico has been  a relatively  small exporter of 
textiles and apparel.  East Asian countries exported only $8.7 billion to the 
U.S. market in 1990 under the MFA, out of total U.S. imports under the MFA 
of $27.9 billion.  It would thus appear that, at least as far as a U.S.-Mexico 
free trade area is concerned, any trade diversion in textiles and apparel would 
be likely to be relatively small and would have more effect on suppliers other 
than the East Asian NICS and Japan. 
2.4  Implication of a North American FTA on the World Wading 
System 
Despite the size of Mexico and Latin America in terms both of population 
and geography, the economic policies adopted by the countries of the region 
have left them very small and poor economically. The negative economic con- 
sequences of inner-oriented policies did not become evident until the  1980s, 
when economic growth ground to a halt in most of Latin America. Although 
efforts at policy reform are under way  in  a number of countries,  there  are 
many-including  notably  the biggest,  Brazil  and Argentina-where  efforts 
have not as yet been able to reverse the decline in economic activity. 
When policy reform is successful, economic growth can accelerate, based 
on export-led growth in response to altered incentives. This was demonstrated 
by the East Asian NICs several decades ago. As export-led growth acceler- 
ates, exporters in the countries whose policies have been successfully altered 
will no doubt increase their competitiveness and their share of world markets. 
That share is currently  abnormally  low in response to the highly protective 
policies that have been followed. To a considerable extent, policy reform in 
Latin America would increase Latin American competitiveness (as it already 
has for Chile), regardless  of whether there are preferential trading arrange- 
ments with Canada and the United States. 
Should policies be successfully reformed, there will be a major reduction 
in the overall level of  protection that Latin American countries accord their 
domestic  producers.  Moreover,  a  successful  FTA  with  the  United  States 
would result in pressure by Latin American exporters for even further tariff 
reductions: insofar as U.S.  tariffs were lower than  those of  Latin American 
countries even after policy reform, those countries’ producers would be con- 
fronted with higher costs of imports than would their American counterparts. 
18. Indeed, Mexico is a net importer of apparel from the United States. 39  American Bilateral Trading Arrangements and East Asia 
Table 2.5  US.  Imports of Multifiber Arrangement Products, 1990 (billions of 
U.S. dollars) 
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Source: U.S. International Trade Commission, U.S.  Imports of  Textiles and Apparel under the 
Multifiber Arrangement: Annual Report for 1990 (Washington, D.C., May 1991). 
It  thus  must  be  concluded  that the  major change that can happen  in  Latin 
America  is significantly  trade creating, as previous  walls  of protection  are 
significantly  reduced. Latin  American  economic  growth should then  make 
Latin American countries more competitive in their export markets but also 
result  in  increased demand  by Latin  America  for goods produced  in North 
America and in the rest of the world. 
When current trade flows and relative economic sizes of  countries are ex- 
amined, the overwhelming conclusion is that the small volume of trade ema- 
nating from Latin America  at the present time implies little opportunity for 
trade diversion. To be sure, the cumulative consequences of trade preferences 
within North America over a ten- or fifteen-year period could be substantial. 
Moreover, it is to be expected that some foreign direct investment that might 
otherwise have been destined for East Asia will instead be directed to Mexico, 
if  for  no  other  reason  than  a  smaller  likelihood  of  actions  under  U.S.- 
administered trade provisions. There are already anecdotal reports of compa- 
nies relocating from East Asia to Mexico in anticipation of an FTA (Hufbauer 
and Schott, 1992, 16). Even so, if the Western Hemisphere countries do open 
their economies  and  achieve more rapid  economic  growth,  the  total  effect 
should be more like that of the European Communities over their first thirty 
years: overall expansion was sufficiently large that trade and investment flows 
increased externally and internally. 
From  the  viewpoint  of  the  United  States,  Latin  American  markets  are 
simply too small relative to Asian and European markets for the United States 
to be  able to afford to cut itself off  from these other geographic areas.  The 
important question is why  the United  States should be willing to enter into 
FTAs with Latin  American  countries.  From an  American  perspective,  any 
trade diversion that does occur will make the United States less competitive in 
world markets, while there are few benefits to an FTA that cannot be realized 40  Anne 0.  Krueger 
in an open, multilateral  system. If  American officials believe that a Western 
Hemisphere  FTA for the United States represents a genuine economic alter- 
native to the present U.S. position as a nondiscriminatory multilateral trader, 
examination of the volumes of trade possible with Latin American countries 
and their specializations should dissuade officials from those views. 
If the Uruguay Round succeeds and existing tariff and nontariff barriers to 
trade are further reduced multilaterally, the potential for trade diversion would 
be minimized. In that context, a Western Hemisphere FTA might provide en- 
couragement to Latin American countries to undertake the policy reforms that 
are in any event in their self-interest. Growth in Latin America could acceler- 
ate sufficiently to be a net benefit to the United States economically. 
An examination of  East  Asian  interests  in  any potential  Western  Hemi- 
sphere free trade arrangement, therefore, shows that they lie in ensuring the 
success of the Uruguay Round and the maintenance of  an open, multilateral 
trading system. In that case, accelerated Latin American growth would con- 
stitute rapidly growing markets for imports, and East Asia should continue to 
be competitive  in those markets.  The smaller the  margin of  preference ac- 
corded by the United States to Latin American countries, the larger the trade- 
liberalizing effects of the Uruguay Round. 
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Comment  Robert E. Baldwin 
A major conclusion  of Anne Krueger’s  paper is that the potential  for trade 
diversion from East Asia to Latin America under U.S. free trade agreements 
with Mexico and possibly with other Latin American countries is quite lim- 
ited.  While I basically  agree with  this,  I do think  that there could  well  be 
somewhat  greater  trade  diversion  than  she believes  will  occur.  However,  I 
agree completely  with  another of her conclusions,  which is implicit  in her 
paper, namely, that any trade diversion that does occur will not cause serious 
adjustment problems for East Asian exporters. It seems to me that this is the 
message of  the numbers she cites concerning the small volume of  U.S.  im- 
ports from Latin America compared to U.S. imports from East Asia in those 
product lines where trade diversion is possible.  Even if  the Latin American 
countries are able to  mobilize  investment  and  labor resources quite rapidly 
and thus  increase their exports to the United  States at high annual rates in 
categories where trade diversion is possible, this still implies relatively mod- 
est rates of decline in the exports of these goods by the East Asian countries 
to the United States. Thus, any required adjustment should be handled quite 
easily. 
As far as the extent of trade diversion is concerned, Krueger argues that it 
will be small because the level of U.S.  protection against Mexican exports is 
already low. The average U.S. tariff against Mexican imports of only 4 percent 
is, of course, an average weighted by current trade volumes. For some low- 
volume imports from Mexico, tariffs are relatively high, namely, on footwear 
and various miscellaneous items like sporting goods. I would not be surprised 
to see a significant volume of trade diversion in these product lines, especially 
because rising wages in Taiwan and Korea are beginning to make these goods 
noncompetitive anyway. Investors from Taiwan and Korea may lead the way 
in shifting production to Mexico. As Krueger points out, apparel and textiles 
are other categories where significant diversion is possible if the United States 
permits free imports of these products from Mexico. I doubt that U.S.  textile 
and apparel manufacturers will allow this, however. 
In addition to the statutory levels of tariff protection, another condition that 
can significantly affect the extent of trade diversion in such products as chem- 
icals and steel is the manner in which the antidumping and countervailing duty 
laws are enforced in a U.S  .-Mexico Free Trade Agreement (FTA). If, as in the 
U.S. -Canada agreement, the antidumping  and countervailing duty laws are 
not administered as strictly as against nonmember countries,  the production 
of  some of these goods could be shifted from East Asia to Mexico and other 
potential Latin American members. 
The point that Krueger makes about the potential for trade diversion in the 
Robert E. Baldwin is professor of economics at the University of  Wisconsin-Madison  and a 
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machinery and transportation equipment category is a very good one. As she 
points out, U.S. imports from Mexico in this category are composed largely 
of products whose components are exported to Mexico from the United States 
and then  assembled  by  Mexican labor.  Duty  is  paid  only on the  Mexican 
value-added component in the final product. This means that the average im- 
plicit duty on these goods is quite low-a  fact that does not leave much room 
for trade diversion. However, the extent to which East Asian and other export- 
ers ship components to Mexico after the FTA will also depend crucially on the 
foreign-content  rules in the agreement. If  a product can have a high foreign 
content and still be regarded as a Mexican product with duty-free privileges, 
then diversion via this route could become important. But U.S. domestic in- 
terests are likely to block this. 
Two other factors that Krueger touches on and that are likely to operate to 
keep both trade diversion  and trade creation down are the rules concerning 
environmental conditions and labor standards that are likely to be included in 
the agreement. The president did have to make concessions on these matters 
in order to get Congress to extend the fast-track authority needed for negoti- 
ating a North American FTA. If new imports from Mexico (and perhaps exist- 
ing imports) must be based on production conforming to stricter environmen- 
tal and labor standards than now prevail, this will act as a new nontariff barrier 
to these imports. Conceivably, what is gained in trade terms by Mexico be- 
cause of a zero-duty tariff on its exports to the United States could be offset by 
such new nontariff trade measures.  For example, it is quite possible that im- 
ports from Mexico will be subject to countervailing duties if they are not pro- 
duced in a manner that meets strict environmental and labor standards. I think 
that  shortly  we will  see such environmental  standards  pushed  strongly  in 
multilateral forums as well as regional ones. 
In conclusion, I think that, while there are some categories of goods where 
trade diversion may be important, it will have only a modest adjustment effect 
on East Asian countries, like Taiwan and Korea, that are already upgrading 
beyond labor-intensive manufacturers. The greatest effect of any trade diver- 
sion is, as Krueger points out, likely to be on countries like Indonesia and Sri 
Lanka, which like Mexico also abound in unskilled labor. 
Comment  Kuo-shu Liang 
I  read Anne Krueger’s paper with great interest and relief.  She pointed out 
that, “in recent years, the American commitment to an open multilateral sys- 
tem has been, at least to a degree, eroded as U.S. policy has shifted to a “two- 
Kuo-shu Liang is chairman of the Bank of Communications in Taipei, Taiwan, and professor of 
economics at National Taiwan University. 43  American Bilateral Trading Arrangements and East Asia 
pronged” approach. On the one hand, the United States has continued to par- 
ticipate in the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations; on the other hand, the 
United States has indicated a willingness to bargain bilaterally for free trade 
areas with individual trading nations.” She concludes that “it . . . seems plau- 
sible to assume that, over the next five years, any Western Hemisphere inte- 
gration that does occur will take place between Canada, the United States, and 
Mexico.”  However,  “it is . . . unlikely  that Canada will be able to use the 
small margin of preference under American tariffs to divert U.S. or Mexican 
imports from East Asian sources.  . . . Likewise, Canadian imports . . . from 
East Asian countries are small (and negligible from Mexico), and trade diver- 
sion in significant orders of magnitude does not appear to be a realistic possi- 
bility. . . . Rather,  it is with Mexico that East Asian exporters may be more 
concerned.” “Mexico might in any event,” she continues, “become more com- 
petitive,  especially in labor-intensive commodities.” But the Mexican rising 
imports would at least partially offset some trade diversion that may occur. If 
Mexican imports were permitted freely under a free trade agreement (FTA), 
there could be only a relatively small trade diversion in textiles and apparels. 
Concerning  the  important  question of  “why the United  States should be 
willing to enter into FTAs with Latin American countries,” Krueger stresses 
that FTAs “might provide encouragement to Latin American countries to un- 
dertake the policy reforms that are in any event in their self-interest  and that 
the effect on growth  and living  standards in Latin  America could be  suffi- 
ciently positive to be a net benefit to the United States economically.” Krueger 
also stresses  that  the  margin  of  preference  accorded  by  the  United  States 
would  be  smaller  the  larger  the  trade-liberalizing  effects  of  the  Uruguay 
Round.  Therefore,  if  one  examines “East  Asian  interests  in  any  potential 
Western Hemisphere free trade agreement,” those interests “lie in ensuring the 
success of  the Uruguay Round and the maintenance of an open, multilateral 
trading system.” 
I  fully  agree  with  Krueger’s  conclusion  that,  if  the  Uruguay  Round 
crumbles, the barriers will become tougher. However, the important question 
that  has  to be  answered  is whether  bilateral  trade  deals  can  coexist  with 
GATT’s multilateral body. 
Reflecting  multilateralism  and  nondiscrimination,  GATT  provides  rules 
that would enable the contracting parties to gain from trade according to the 
principles of the theory of comparative advantage. However, GATT’s success 
in reducing import quotas and tariffs has led nations to turn to other methods 
to obtain trade advantages,  such as production  subsidies,  restrictive  quality 
standards, and other barriers that are more difficult to identify and police. In 
accommodating  the  political  objectives  of  powerful  members,  GATT  also 
compromises on the most-favored-nation principle in dealing with the ques- 
tion of integration. Article XXIV legitimates the formation of customs unions 
and free trade areas to lower tariffs among participants without extending the 
privilege to other nonparticipating  countries,  thus denying them the benefits 44  Anne 0.  Krueger 
of most-favored-nation rights. The United States used Article XXIV to initiate 
a looser Western Hemisphere free trade area. By encouraging bilateral  trade 
deals rather than GATT’s multilateral sort, the 1988 Trade Act has given ex- 
porters a new, bilateral lever, the threat of trade retaliation, with which to open 
markets abroad. 
However,  even  while  Krueger  and  others may  argue that  the  emerging 
Western Hemisphere free trade area will be trade creating and offer little op- 
portunity  for trade diversion, the East Asian countries have been concerned 
that the free trade area may replace the freer, multilateral trading system by a 
trade bloc, and they  may take retaliatory  actions under the pretext of unfair 
trade or antidumping protests. As a result, the politically powerful trade bloc 
will divert trade from less powerful but efficient rivals. In a bilateral confron- 
tation, the weak will concede-resentfully-and  the strong will retaliate.  It 
is recommended that discriminatory trade agreements  be put under the sur- 
veillance of GATT, with strict rules and effective measures for mediation. 
Of Professor Krueger’s argument that FTAs might encourage Latin Ameri- 
can countries to undertake policy reform, the reasons why bilateral attempts 
will work better than multilateral attempts need to be elaborated. Trade policy 
may  be  utilized  to secure a particular  economic objective, but  this will  be 
related to a “policy assignment” problem. The bilateral “open foreign markets 
aggressively” policies, based on an exaggerated  “I am more open than thou” 
presumption, may produce an atmosphere of mutual hostility, the suspicion of 
unfair manipulation, and charges of unfair trade (Bhagwati 1988, 126). Trade 
policy has to be used to secure gains from trade, and other policies have to be 
used to reform economic policies not related to trade. 
Finally, Taiwan has shown a great interest in negotiating with the United 
States  to form a  U.S.-Taiwan  free  trade  area.  It  is  recommended  that  the 
United  States  and other major  industrial  powers  support  Taiwan’s entrance 
into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. In the past forty years, ex- 
ceptionally high rates of  economic growth have transformed Taiwan from an 
underdeveloped island into the fifteenth largest trading power in the world and 
one of  the world’s most dynamic economies. Taiwan’s entrance  into GATT 
will be a significant step toward ending its economic and diplomatic isolation 
and will enable it to play a more active role in the world economy. 
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